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1 Introduction 
 
 There is a minority strand of Trinitarian thought that attempts to be 
orthodox while also affirming that the divine persons are numerically 
identical.1 Naturally, any view which identifies the divine persons with 
each other invites worries about modalism, with one author alleging that 
the idea is ‘quite straightforwardly heretical’.2 But the minority insists that, 
though the Father, Son, and Spirit are numerically identical, none of them 
                                               
1 Perhaps the clearest case is Effingham (2015). Effingham claims to be following in the 
footsteps of Leftow (2004) on this point, but it’s unclear whether he is right about that. On 
the one hand, Hasker (2013) - who has engaged with Leftow at length - also reads Leftow’s 
model as entailing the identity of the divine persons. But Rea (2009a) reads him differently, 
and Leftow’s (2007) later addition (modification?) to his model seems to vindicate Rea’s 
interpretation. Either way, Leftow’s work has at least suggested this way of thinking about 
the Trinity. (Thanks to a referee for pressing me on this in their comments on a different 
article.) 
2 Hasker (2013), 116; Hasker’s worry is not idiosyncratic. Modalism, which claims that the 
divine persons are in fact merely modes of one and the same person, was officially rejected 
as a heresy by the early church. Prima facie, it is hard to see how one can claim that the 
divine persons are identical without thereby endorsing modalism. Relatedly, one might 
think that the doctrine of the divine processions entails that the persons are distinct (as, 
e.g., Augustine, De Trinitate Book I.2; thanks to a referee for this reference). 
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is the same person as any of the others. The challenge is how to make sense 
of this position.3 
 Fortunately for fans of this minority view, I think there is a plausible 
metaphysics that can give them exactly what they want: Ned Markosian’s 
(2008 & 2010) episodic account of identity under a sortal. In this paper, I 
present Markosian’s account, and use it to sketch a model of the Trinity. 
Then I show that the model can be used to solve at least three important 
Trinitarian puzzles:  the traditional ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, which 
is about how three different persons can be one God; a less-discussed 
problem that has been dubbed the ‘problem of triunity’, which is about how 
each person of the Trinity can be God without being triune; and a problem 
about a tension between the divine processions and aseity, which has been 
enjoying increased attention in the recent literature.  
 
2 When People Outnumber Objects 
 
Ned Markosian’s episodic account of identity under a sortal is 
inspired in part by the fact that there are possible situations in which people 
seem to outnumber objects. Consider the case which Markosian (2008) calls 
‘The Mummy’4:  
 
Once upon a time there was a man who lived a long and happy life. 
Then he died, and his body was preserved, as a mummy, for a 
million years. Eventually the mummy came to the attention of a 
powerful being, who gradually rearranged the particles that 
composed the mummy until they came to compose a living, 
breathing, human person who happened to be a woman and who 
                                               
3 Notice that this position differs from the ‘simple trinitarianism’ recently defended by 
Shieva Kleinshmidt (2016 & 2018). While both views deny that the persons are to be 
identified with entities distinct from God, the view I aim to defend identifies them with 
God, whereas the simple trinitarian denies that they are in our ontology at all.  
4 A different version of the case appears in his (2010).  
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had a psychology that was utterly different and discontinuous from 
the psychology of the man from the beginning of the story (17).  
 
Markosian presents another version of this story in his (2010), and, taking 
into account his description and treatment of both cases, it’s clear that 
Markosian is not imagining that the mummy is disassembled and then 
reassembled into a woman. Rather, the mummy’s particles are rearranged 
without ever being disassembled in order to transform the Mummy into a 
woman, perhaps in something like the way one might mould a hunk of clay.   
Markosian’s interpretation of this case is that the man at the 
beginning of the story is the same object as the woman at the end of the 
story, but the man at the beginning of the story is not the same person as the 
woman at the end of the story (17).5 I am inclined to agree. After all, at no 
point in this transformation would it appear to a bystander that any human-
shaped object had gone in or out of existence rather than merely changing.6 
By my lights, this is a strong reason to think that the woman is the same 
object as the man. And yet the woman at the end of the story is neither 
biologically nor psychologically continuous with - or even similar to - the 
man.7 Moreover, one might think that, intuitively, the woman ought not to 
be praised and blamed for the deeds performed by the man in his lifetime. 
By my lights, these are strong reasons to think that the woman is not the 
same person as the man.  
But I don’t have the space to defend Markosian’s interpretation of 
The Mummy case in detail, and that is not the purpose of this paper. My 
                                               
5 In the service of developing a model of the Trinity, Effingham (2015) has also presented 
a case of this sort - an even more exotic one involving synchronic multilocation. 
6 This characterization of the Mummy case as involving mere change and not going in or 
out of existence is indebted to lecture notes where Markosian suggests that one could view 
death as merely changing rather than going out of existence. Cf. Olson (1997), chs. 2 and 4 
on person as a phase sortal, in contrast to (e.g.) Baker (2000).  
7 Cf. Markosian’s (2008) salamander case, where he argues that an individual x may fail to 
be the same person as an individual y even if x is both biologically and psychologically 
continuous with y.  
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aim is to take Markosian’s account of what is going on in cases like this and 
apply it to the Trinity. So, from here forward, I will assume that Markosian 
is correct about this case, and therefore there are possible cases where some 
individual x is the same object as, but not the same person as, some 
individual y. 
How can some x be the same object as, but not the same person as, 
some y? One way to make sense of this is by appealing to Geach’s doctrine 
of relative identity, or something similar, and a number of Trinitarians have 
gone this route. But Markosian proposes an account of ‘identity under a 
sortal’ which he distinguishes from relative identity theories (2010, 137).8 
He uses his account to develop a new and improved characterization of the 
problem of personal identity, which shifts the focus from the persistence of 
objects that instantiate the property of being a person to the persistence of 
the instantiations of personhood themselves.  
To spell out his view, Markosian introduces three technical terms. 
First, instances are ‘those momentary items, each of which consists of some 
object’s having some property at some instant of time’ (ibid, 137). For 
example, suppose that Tom paints his aunt’s fence white at t1. The fence’s 
being white at t1 is an instance of whiteness.  
Second, instantiations are ‘instances as well as their temporally 
extended cousins’, where the temporally extended cousins are composed of 
instances (ibid, 137). So suppose that after Tom paints the fence, it continues 
to be white from t1 through t2. It’s being white at t1 is both an instance and 
an instantiation of whiteness, while it’s being white from t1 through t2 is an 
instantiation but not an instance of whiteness. However, the latter 
instantiation is composed of (infinitely many) instances of whiteness, 
including the instance at t1.  
                                               
8 Though see Baber (2015) on the metaphysical neutrality of relative identity approaches to 
the Trinity. If she is right about this, then Markosian’s view, and my application of it to the 
Trinity, may actually qualify as an instance of the relative identity approach. Thanks to 
Aaron Arinder for helpful discussion of relative identity and the Trinity.  
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Third, episodes are ‘instantiations that are maximal in the following 
sense: instantiation E of property φ is maximal iff the fusion of E with any 
further instances of φ-ness (i.e., one that is not a part of E) is not a single 
instantiation of φ-ness’ (ibid, 137). Suppose the fence is painted green at t3 
and then white again at t4. So, a new instance of whiteness occurs at t4, 
separated from the earlier instances by a temporary instantiation of 
greenness. Will this new instance of whiteness together with the earlier 
instances of whiteness compose an instantiation of whiteness - one that 
began back at t1, was suspended at t3, and started up again at t4? It’s 
plausible that the answer to this question is no; no single instantiation of 
whiteness jumps the greenness gap. In that case, the t1-t3 instantiation of 
whiteness is an episode of whiteness, and the t4 instance of whiteness 
begins a new episode of whiteness, distinct from the earlier one. 
Equipped with the notion of an episode, Markosian formulates the 
following account of diachronic identity under a sortal: ‘To say that some 
thing, y, that is φ at t2 is the same φ as some thing, x, that is φ at t1 is to say 
that y’s being φ at t2 is part of the same episode of φ-ness as x’s being φ at 
t1’ (ibid, 137). He then applies this account to the sortal person and offers a 
new characterization of the problem of personal identity: it is the problem 
of identifying ‘the conditions under which an instance of personhood at t1 
is part of the same episode of personhood as an instance of personhood at 
t2’ (ibid, 138).  
Markosian uses temporal indices in his account of identity under a 
sortal because he is interested in the problem of diachronic personal 
identity. But there is a risk that this will distract us from the fact that, 
presumably, we can ask of any two or more instances of a sortal property 
whether they belong to the same episode of that property, even if they are 
simultaneous, or if we don’t know their temporal relationship, or perhaps - 
with some tweaking of Markosian’s account - if they are atemporal.9  
                                               
9 We could do this by modifying the definition of ‘instance’ so that both instantaneous and 
atemporal instantiations of P count as instances of P. As for simultaneous instances, 
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So I propose to reformulate Markosian’s account of identity under a 
sortal as follows. We have seen that any instance has as a constituent an 
object which instantiates a property. Call that object the instantiator. Then, 
where E1 and E2 are particular instances of φ-ness, to say that E1’s 
instantiator is the same φ as E2’s instantiator is to say that E1 is part of the 
same episode of φ-ness as E2. And we can reformulate Markosian’s 
characterization of the problem of personal identity as follows. It is the 
problem of identifying the conditions under which two or more instances 
of personhood are part of the same episode of personhood.  
Markosian believes that his episodic view of personal identity makes 
sense of puzzling cases like The Mummy in the following way. Even if there 
is a single human-shaped object which is first a man, then a mummy, and 
then a woman, it’s not implausible that the instances of personhood which 
occur at the beginning of the story while the object is a man are not part of 
the same episode of personhood as the instances of personhood which 
occur at the end of the story while the object is a woman. But if that’s the 
case, then, by Markosian’s account, the woman is not the same person as 
the man, even if they are the same object.  
It’s important to be clear that, on Markosian’s view, people are not 
episodes; they are three-dimensional enduring objects. So in cases like The 
Mummy, where an object is involved in more than one episode of 
personhood, we should not say, e.g., that a single object participates in 
multiple people. Instead, we should say something like this: the object at 
one point in its life fails to be the same person as itself at another point in 
its life.  
This proposal has implications for the apt use of names, predications, 
descriptions, and so forth. Presumably, the man and woman in the mummy 
story will go by different names, and we will tend to predicate different 
properties of them. For example, the woman might go by the name ‘Alice’ 
while the man goes by the name ‘Bill’, and we might say things like ‘Alice 
                                               
Markosian (2004) actually uses his account to make sense of what is going on in certain 
backward time travel cases.  
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is not a man’, taking ourselves to be saying something true. But how can 
we make sense of this if Alice is the same object as - and so numerically 
identical to - Bill, who seems to be a man?  
 We can make sense of this by saying that, at least in the cases when 
people outnumber objects, names for people track the same-person-as 
relation. An object will have different names associated with its different 
episodes of personhood, and correctly using one of its names means using 
it both to refer to that object and using it only when the appropriate episode 
of personhood is salient.10 If names are associated with episodes of 
personhood in this way, we can understand predications like ‘Alice is not a 
man’ as expressing a proposition that is true iff Alice is not the same person 
as anyone who is a man, i.e., iff the episode of personhood associated with 
the name ‘Alice’ is not an episode of personhood during which Alice is a 
man.  
So Markosian’s episodic account of identity under a sortal has, 
among other things, this to recommend it: it makes sense of apparently 
possible cases where people seem to outnumber objects. But notoriously, 
the doctrine of the Trinity is also a case where people seem to outnumber 
objects. So it’s time to bring Markosian’s proposal to bear on that subject.  
 
3 An Episodic Model of the Trinity 
 
I will now present an episodic model of the Trinity that exploits 
Markosian’s account of identity under a sortal. I will build the model out of 
ideas borrowed from other models of the Trinity in the literature, but recast 
them in terms of Markosian’s metaphysics.  
Brian Leftow (2004) has sketched a model of the Trinity on which 
there is one divine substance that is living three simultaneous or atemporal 
lives, each of which is the life of a Trinitarian person. This thought can be 
                                               
10 The idea that names are associated with certain episodes comes from Markosian, who 
once made the point in lecture, but I do not know whether he would endorse everything I 
say about it here.  
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recast in Markosian’s terms as follows: God is a single, divine substance 
that is simultaneously or atemporally participating in three distinct 
episodes of personhood—those of the Father, Son, and Spirit. That will be 
the foundational thesis of my episodic model of the Trinity.  
One might wonder whether it is possible for the divine substance (or 
anything else) to participate in multiple episodes of personhood at once. 
After all, the object in the mummy case only participates in one episode at 
a time. But imagine that after making the mummy into the woman, the 
powerful being sends the woman back in time so that she lives for a while 
alongside the man who is to become the mummy. Then we have one object 
participating in two episodes of personhood at once.  
A critic might press the objection by insisting that the time-traveler 
can only participate in multiple episodes of personhood at once because she 
is multilocated - the thought being that distinct episodes of personhood 
must occur at distinct spatiotemporal locations. Then, if God is outside of 
space, God can’t participate in multiple episodes of personhood.11 But it’s 
false that distinct episodes of personhood must occur at distinct 
spatiotemporal locations. There could be a pair of duplicate ghosts 
colocated with each other, and then two different episodes of personhood 
would be occurring in the very same region.  
A different worry emerges at this point. In the case of the colocated 
ghosts, it’s clear that there are two episodes of personhood at the relevant 
region, because there are two objects instantiating personhood at that 
region. But if the three divine episodes of personhood are each 
instantiations of the same property (personhood) by the same substance 
(God), and they do not occur at different times or places, then what 
individuates them?  
                                               
11 It’s possible that something like this thought motivates Effingham’s (2015) multilocation 
model of the Trinity. The time travel case in this paragraph is indebted to Effingham’s and 
Leftow’s multilocation and time travel cases, which they use in developing their own 
models of the Trinity.  
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One option is to say that the distinctness of instantiations is a brute 
fact. But even if they have to differ qualitatively in order to be distinct, there 
is no problem here, for they do not all stand in the same relations. Below I 
will adapt Swinburne’s (1994) model of the divine processessions between 
the Trinitarian persons for use in the episodic model of the Trinity. Just as 
Swinburne argues that the divine persons are individuated by their causal 
interrelationships, so the episodic Trinitarian can say that the three episodes 
of personhood are individuated by their causal relationships.12 
I will borrow the next element of the episodic model from Effingham 
(2015): the divine persons are not the same person because they are not 
linked by immanent causal relations. His thought is that, given the popular 
view that immanent causal relations are necessary for personal identity, we 
can ensure that the divine persons are not the same person by denying that 
they stand in any such relations. But immanent causal relations hold 
between stages in the life of an object, and the endurantist takes these stages 
to be events or, in Markosian’s terminology, instantiations (Zimmerman 
1997). In that case, it is easy to recast Effingham’s idea in terms of 
Markosian’s metaphysics: the three divine episodes of personhood are 
episodes and not merely instantiations because none of them immanently 
causes another.13  
This leads us to another useful idea which has been explicitly 
endorsed by Moreland and Craig (2005): that God, though a single 
immaterial substance, has three sets of mental faculties sufficient for 
personhood. For each episode of personhood occurs in virtue of 
instantiations of certain psychological properties, such as faculties of 
thought and volition. But if the episodes of personhood are not immanent-
causally linked, then it’s natural to think that the instantiations of those 
                                               
12 See Swinburne (1994), 163-9 and ch. 8, esp. 176-7.  
13 Markosian himself emphasizes that his ‘episodic characterization of the problem of 
personal identity’ is compatible with various standard views regarding the conditions on 
personal identity.  
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psychological properties are not immanent-causally linked either. And just 
as the absence of immanent causal relations between instantiations of 
personhood is sufficient to ensure that the divine persons are not all the 
same person, so the absence of immanent causal relations between 
instantiations of these psychological properties is sufficient to ensure that 
God’s mental faculties are not all the same set of mental faculties. Instead, 
each divine person has their own set of mental faculties. (Similarly, in the 
mummy case, the woman and the man each have their own set of mental 
faculties, the woman’s having been created by the powerful being when it 
made her out of the mummy.)  
Finally, I will top off the model with an episodic adaptation of 
Swinburne’s (1994) story about the causal relationships between the divine 
persons. I propose that the Father’s episode of personhood occurs simply 
because God is a divine being, and a divine being is essentially a personal 
being. By nature, God instantiates whatever psychological properties are 
necessary for being a person. The Son’s episode of personhood occurs 
because the Father wills that there is an instantiation of personhood by the 
divine substance which is not immanent-causally linked to the Father’s 
instantiation of personhood. And the Spirit’s episode occurs because one or 
both of these persons will(s) that there is yet another instantiation of 
personhood by the divine substance which is not connected by immanent-
causal relations to either the Father’s or the Son’s instantiations of 
personhood.14 I leave it open whether these divine volitions are atemporal, 
simultaneous, or sequential but sempiternal in the way suggested by 
Swinburne. I also leave it open whether God engages in these volitions 
contingently or necessarily. 
That’s the model. I will devote the rest of my space to considering 
first what I take to be the most serious worry for this model, and then what 
I take to be its main selling point.  
 
                                               
14 Effingham (2018) defends a causal account of the divine processions.  
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4 Modalism 
 
I expect the main worry about the model will be that it entails 
modalism. Modalism is the heresy which claims that the divine ‘persons’ 
are merely different modes of, or roles filled by, a single person, rather than 
different persons. It’s natural to fear that the episodic model falls into this 
heresy since it claims that the divine persons are numerically identical.15 
Let’s call the Father’s episode of personhood F and the instances 
which compose it the F-instances; call the Son’s episode S and the instances 
which compose it the S-instances; and call the Spirit’s episode H and the 
instances which compose it the H-instances. Since the very same divine 
substance features in each of these instances, the instantiator of the F-
instances = the instantiator of the S-instances = the instantiator of the H-
instances. And that sounds like modalism.16 
But recall (my formulation of) Markosian’s account of identity under 
a sortal: where E1 and E2 are particular instances of φ-ness, to say that E1’s 
instantiator is the same φ as E2’s instantiator is to say that E1 is part of the 
same episode of φ-ness as E2. Apply this to the episodic model of the 
Trinity. To say that the instantiator of the F-instances is the same person as 
the instantiator of the S-instances (for example) is to say that the F-instances 
are part of the same episode of personhood as the S-instances. But they’re 
not. The F-instances compose one episode of personhood, the S-instances 
another, and the H-instances yet another. So, if Markosian’s episodic view 
of personal identity is right, the model is not modalist.  
A critic might think this is a shallow victory, because even if the 
model is not technically modalist, it cannot make sense of standard 
Trinitarian claims that predicate different properties of the divine persons, 
like ‘The Son became incarnate but the Father and Spirit did not’. For even 
                                               
15 Likewise, defenders of other models of the Trinity which either identify the divine 
persons with each other or have been interpreted as doing so have felt a special burden to 
show that their models are not modalist: see Leftow (2004) and Effingham (2015).  
16 Remember the quote from Hasker (2013), 116, in my opening paragraph.  
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if the model is not technically modalist, one might think that this sentence 
expresses something that is not merely incompatible with modalism, but 
also incompatible with the position that the divine persons are numerically 
identical. After all, it predicates different properties of the divine persons, 
and so, by the indiscernibility of identicals, they are numerically distinct.17  
My response to this objection begins with the observation that the 
exact nature of the unusual unity between the divine persons has always 
been unclear. The creeds tell us certain things about the unity of the 
persons, such as that they share the same divine nature, and that, while each 
is God, there is just one God. But Christians have usually admitted that this 
doctrine is deeply mysterious, and those who have explored this mystery 
have disagreed both about how the creedal claims should be interpreted, 
and what metaphysical details might undergird them.  
In light of these observations, I think it is unlikely that the sentence 
‘The Son became incarnate but the Father and Spirit did not’, in ordinary 
Trinitarian usage, expresses something metaphysically nuanced enough to 
be incompatible with the episodic model of the Trinity. More likely, it 
expresses something with a fair amount of metaphysical neutrality - 
something that would be true given any of a range of the proposed 
Trinitarian models, perhaps including models on which the persons are 
different persons and yet numerically identical.  
This opens up space for the episodic Trinitarian to suggest that these 
sentences have the following truth conditions. Recall the way we 
approached sentences like ‘Alice is not a man’. We noted that, at least in 
cases when people outnumber objects, names for people track the same-
person-as relation, meaning that an object will have different names 
associated with its different episodes of personhood. When it comes to the 
Trinity, the names ‘the Father’, ‘the Son’, and ‘the Spirit’ will be associated 
with episodes F, S, and H, respectively. If that’s right, we can understand 
predications like ‘The Son became incarnate but the Father and Spirit did 
                                               
17 That the Father and Son must be distinct because they have different properties is a point 
often emphasized by Dale Tuggy.  
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not’ as expressing a proposition that is true iff the Son, but not the Father or 
Spirit, is the same person as someone who is incarnate, i.e., iff the episode of 
personhood associated with the name ‘the Son’, but not those associated 
with the names ‘The Father’ or ‘the Spirit’, is an episode of personhood 
during which God is incarnate.  
Of course, nothing can literally occur during one episode and not the 
others, since they are either simultaneous or atemporal. But there is a way 
around this glitch. We have seen that each divine episode of personhood 
occurs in virtue of a different set of divine mental faculties. And God will 
have some properties - like the property of becoming incarnate - in virtue 
of the activity of one set of mental faculties and not the others. Therefore, I 
propose that we revise our account of having a property P during an episode 
E such that a subject S’s having P during E is shorthand for the claim that 
S’s having P and E’s occurring obtain in virtue of facts about the same set 
of mental faculties.  
So I think the main worry facing this model - that it entails modalism 
- can be defused. What about its main virtue?  
 
5 Solving the Puzzles 
 
By my lights, the main virtue of this model is how nicely it handles 
familiar puzzles about the Trinity. In this section, I will argue that it solves 
three such puzzles.  
 
5.1 First Puzzle: The Logical Problem of the Trinity 
 
Consider first the well-worn ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, so 
named by Cartwright (1990), which is sometimes formulated as an 
inconsistent triad: 
 
1. There is one God. 
2. There are three divine persons. 
3. Every divine person is God. 
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The doctrine of the Trinity entails that each of these claims is true, but their 
conjunction appears to be logically inconsistent. However, I will argue that 
the episodic model of the Trinity dissolves this problem.  
Let’s take ‘God’ to name a substance that instantiates deity, and let’s 
take (1) and (3) at face value: there is one substance that instantiates deity, 
and every divine person is numerically identical to that substance. All of 
this is true on the episodic model. Does it follow that there are not three 
divine persons? That depends on how we should count people on 
Markosian’s view.  
I think that how we should count depends on what sortal we are 
interested in. If we really want to know how many objects there are, then we 
should count by the ordinary identity relation.18 But if we want to know 
how many people there are, then we have to play by the rules of the relevant 
sortal. We should count by identity under the person sortal. So, where an 
object in one part of its life fails to stand in the same-person-as relation to 
itself in another part of its life, we should count two people, despite the fact 
that we would also count just one object. In cases of this sort, counting 
people by the counting rules appropriate to the person sortal requires us, in 
effect, to double-count (or triple-count, etc.) objects by the counting rules 
appropriate to the object sortal.  
To illustrate this counting procedure, consider the Mummy case. In 
that case, we have an object which participates in an episode of personhood 
at an earlier interval when it is a man, and then participates in a second 
episode of personhood at a later interval when it is a woman. Therefore it 
fails to stand in the same-person-as relation to itself across the two intervals. 
So, counting by the same-person-as relation, there are two people in the 
course of this story.  
                                               
18 I borrow the talk of ‘counting by identity’ vs. other ways of counting from Brower and 
Rea (2005), who distinguish counting by identity from counting by numerical sameness. 
And following Rea (2009b), I take it that identity under the sortal object just is the ordinary 
identity relation.  
  15 
Now imagine for a moment that God also participates in multiple 
episodes of personhood sequentially: first there is an interval during which 
God participates in the Father’s episode of personhood; then, after a 
relevant causal discontinuity which ends the Father’s episode, there is a 
later interval during which God participates in the Son’s episode; which is 
in turn followed by the Spirit’s episode. As in the Mummy case, God fails 
to be the same person as Godself across these intervals associated with each 
episode. So, counting by the same-person-as relation, there are three divine 
persons in the course of this story.  
And since it is the fact that the episodes are different episodes, and 
not their sequential relationship, that is doing the crucial work, we should 
still count three people if we imagine that the episodes are not sequential 
after all, but rather simultaneous or atemporal (something which I have 
already argued is possible). So, even though the divine persons are 
numerically identical as (1) and (3) imply, when we count them in the way 
appropriate to the person sortal, we count three of them.  
 
5.2 Second Puzzle: The Problem of Triunity 
 
Let’s consider a second puzzle - one that I dubbed the ‘Problem of 
Triunity’ (Mooney 2018), because it centres on the property of triunity, 
which God seems to have but which the persons individually do not seem 
to have. Once again, the puzzle is an inconsistent triad: 
 
1. God is triune. 
2. The Son is God. 
3. The Son is not triune. 
 
(2018, 2). Any of the divine persons could be substituted for the Son to 
generate the puzzle. Whichever person we plug in, the resulting 
propositions will be jointly inconsistent, and so at least one of the claims in 
the triad must be false. The problem is that Trinitarians often affirm (1) and 
(2), and they seem disposed to affirm (3) as well.  
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 But for the episodic Trinitarian, saying ‘The Son is not triune’ is like 
saying, in the mummy case, ‘Alice is not two people’. Imagine that Alice 
travels back in time to exist alongside the man she once was. At that time, 
strictly speaking, Alice is two people, since Alice is an object participating 
in two episodes of personhood. But since the name ‘Alice’ is associated with 
just one of those episodes, ‘Alice is not two people’ will ordinarily express 
a proposition that is true iff Alice is not the same person as anyone who is two 
people, i.e., iff the episode of personhood associated with the name ‘Alice’ 
is not an episode of personhood during which she is two people. On the 
revised account of what it is to have a property during an episode of 
personhood, introduced in the section on modalism, this will be so iff it is 
not the case that the episode associated with the name ‘Alice’ obtains in 
virtue of facts about both the woman’s and man’s sets of cognitive faculties. 
Since it does not, Alice is not the same person as anyone who is two people.  
 Similarly for (3). Strictly speaking, the Son is triune, since the Son is 
the divine substance that participates in three distinct episodes of 
personhood at once. But since the name ‘the Son’ is associated with a certain 
episode of personhood, ‘the Son is not triune’ will normally express a 
proposition that is true iff the Son is not the same person as anyone who is 
triune, i.e., iff the episode of personhood associated with the name ‘the Son’ 
is not an episode of personhood during which the Son is triune. Given the 
revised account of what it is to have a property ‘during’ an episode of 
personhood, the divine substance is triune during one of its episodes of 
personhood iff that episode occurs in virtue of facts about all three divine 
sets of mental faculties. Since there is no such episode, the Son is not the 
same person as anyone who is triune. 
So, strictly speaking, the Son is triune and yet the Son is not the same 
person as anyone who is triune, and the expression ‘the Son is not triune’ 
often expresses the latter proposition. When it does, it expresses a 
proposition that is both true and consistent with the conjunction of (1) and 
(2).  
But is that enough? Let personal triunity be the property of being the 
same person as someone who is triune. In my (2018) I argued that triunity 
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is an essential divine attribute, and so the Son must be triune to qualify as 
divine (3-7). A critic might suggest that personal triunity is also an essential 
divine attribute, and so the Son must not only be triune, but also the same 
person as someone who is triune, to qualify as divine. In defence of this 
claim, our critic might say that my reasons for thinking that triunity is an 
essential divine attribute carry over to personal triunity. 
But as it turns out, they don’t. Let’s consider each in turn. First, I 
observed in the earlier article that triunity is similar to paradigmatic divine 
attributes in that, e.g., it is one of God’s essential properties. But personal 
triunity is not one of God’s essential properties, for the simple reason that 
it is not a property that God has at all. God has personal triunity iff the 
expression ‘God is the same person as someone who is triune’ expresses 
something true. And that expression is true iff God participates in an 
episode of personhood during which someone is triune. But we have 
already observed that there is no such episode. So God does not instantiate 
personal triunity.  
Second, I argued in the earlier article that triunity’s being an essential 
divine attribute explains why God is triune. But again, there is no parallel 
reason to think that personal triunity is an essential divine attribute, since 
God doesn’t instantiate personal triunity. If God doesn’t have the property, 
we don’t need to explain why God has it.  
Third, I contended that triunity is a great-making property, and any 
great-making property is an essential divine attribute.19 Is personal triunity 
also a great-making property, and so also an essential divine attribute? It’s 
hard to see why it would be. Having personal triunity entails having 
valuable personal and interpersonal properties, but triunity alone seems to 
be sufficient to secure properties of that sort. So it is not clear that adding 
personal triunity on top of triunity would make any difference in overall 
greatness.  
                                               
19 Actually, I allowed for exceptions in cases where great-making properties are not 
possible or not compossible, but that isn’t relevant to the present discussion.  
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As far as I can see, the episodic Trinitarian does not need to concede 
that personal triunity is an essential divine attribute, and so she does not 
need to say that the Son has that property. But she can and should say that 
the Son has triunity, for she has a promising way to deny (3) in the sense 
that makes it inconsistent with (1) and (2), thereby dissolving the puzzle. 
  
5.3 Third Puzzle: A Problem about the Processions 
 
 Let’s consider one more puzzle. The recent literature has seen 
increased discussion of the divine processions (e.g. Mullins 2017, Hasker 
2017, Effingham 2018, Makin 2018). Much of the discussion is focused on a 
problem having to do with divine aseity. If God has the property of aseity, 
then God cannot causally or metaphysically depend on anything. But it’s 
hard to make sense of the notion that the Son is begotten by the Father 
without understanding this as involving some kind of causal or 
metaphysical dependence of the Son on the Father (Mullins 2017). Since the 
Son is God, this creates a problem, which can again be formulated as an 
inconsistent triad:  
 
1. God is not begotten. 
2. The Son is God. 
3. The Son is begotten. 
 
A similar puzzle can be constructed around the spiration of the Holy Spirit. 
But once again, I think the episodic model of the Trinity solves this puzzle.  
 To see how, let’s return one more time to the mummy case. We’ve 
seen that when the powerful being takes the mummy and turns it into a 
woman, the being has not created a new object. But it has caused that object 
to be a person that is not the same person as it was before, when it was a 
man. So, the woman does not depend either causally or metaphysically on 
the actions of the powerful being for her existence, but she does depend 
causally on the actions of the powerful being for being a person who is a 
different person than the man.  
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 I think we can say the same about the Son. Since the Son is identical 
to God, and God does not depend either causally or metaphysically on 
anything for God’s existence, the Son does not depend either causally or 
metaphysically on anything for the Son’s existence. But the Son does 
depend causally on the Father for being a person who is a different person 
than the Father. The episodic Trinitarian can suggest that this is what it 
means for the Son to be begotten of the Father.  
 And that gives her a strategy for solving the puzzle about the 
processions. For the set of propositions in the triad to be jointly inconsistent, 
we must read (1) as expressing a proposition which is true iff God is not 
identical to some substance that is begotten. But if we do read it that way, 
then (1) is false. For God is a substance that is identical to the Son, and the 
Son is begotten. And we have just seen that being begotten does not imply 
failing to have the property of aseity, since it is not about depending either 
causally or metaphysically on something else for one’s existence. So 
denying (1) turns out to be unproblematic after all.  
By similar reasoning, we can show that God is a substance that is 
identical to the Spirit, and so God is spirated, and yet God still has the 
property of aseity. God both begets and spirates Godself. Even so, for 
reasons that are by now familiar, only the Son is the same person as the divine 
person who is begotten, and only the Spirit is the same person as the divine 
person who is spirated.  
One could object that my understanding of aseity is too weak. 
Perhaps aseity is not merely independence with respect to one’s existence, 
but rather independence with respect to all of one’s properties, or all of 
one’s intrinsic properties, or etc. Then the episodic model of begetting and 
spirating that I just proposed will run afoul of our suitably strengthened 
account of aseity, for the causal dependence of some of the divine persons 
on others entails that God is causally dependent with respect to properties 
like being triune.  
My response to this objection is that, however we analyse aseity, our 
analysis should not have the consequence that God cannot depend on 
Godself for God’s properties. Intuitively, if there is any difference between 
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self-dependence and independence, it is not a difference which threatens 
God’s aseity or God’s perfection more generally. Presumably this is why 
God’s aseity is often characterized, not as independence simpliciter, but as 
independence of everything distinct from God (e.g. Brower (2009)). And 
since the episodic model entails that the divine persons are numerically 
identical to God, causal dependence of one divine person on another in 
some respect turns out to be a case of God depending on Godself in that 
respect. Aseity is preserved.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
 By using Markosian’s episodic account of identity under a sortal, 
and his application of that account to the person sortal in particular, we can 
construct a model of the Trinity which vindicates the minority position that 
the divine persons can be numerically identical without being the same 
person. Moreover, I’ve argued that the model solves at least three problems 
for the doctrine of the Trinity that have been discussed in the literature: the 
logical problem of the Trinity, the problem of Triunity, and a problem about 
the divine processions. So, the model seems to have a lot going for it. At the 
very least, it should prove attractive to those with certain metaphysical 
sensibilities.20  
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